What happens if the government's willingness to stabilize a large stock of debt is waning, while the central bank is adamant about preventing a rise in inflation? The large fiscal imbalance brings about inflationary pressures, triggering a monetary tightening, further debt accumulation, and additional inflationary pressure. Thus, the economy will go through a spiral of higher inflation, output contraction, and further debt accumulation. A coordinated commitment to inflate away the portion of debt resulting from a large recession leads to better macroeconomic outcomes by separating the issue of long-run fiscal sustainability from the need for short-run fiscal stabilization. This strategy can also be used to rule out episodes in which the central bank becomes constrained by the zero lower bound.
Introduction
One of the main legacies of the Great Recession is the severe …scal imbalance that is characterizing many advanced economies. Some scholars have argued that …scal imbalances can a¤ect both in ‡ation and real activity, even in the absence of plain default on government debt (Leeper 1991; Sims 1994; Woodford 1994 .) Whether these e¤ects materialize or not largely depends on expectations about future monetary and …scal policies. One possibility is that the government is expected to be able to take the adequate corrective …scal measures to stabilize the dynamics of debt, while the central bank is credibly committed to keeping in ‡ation stable. 1 In this case, the macroeconomic implications of …scal imbalances have been shown to be quite tenuous. Alternatively, the private sector may …nd it implausible that the large debt can be stabilized by just future economic growth and …scal adjustments. When this type of belief starts materializing, in ‡ation expectations tend to rise because the private sector expects that in ‡ation will ultimately stabilize the …scal imbalance. If the central bank is expected to accommodate this upsurge in in ‡ation expectations, the real interest rate falls, causing a temporary economic boom and a reduction in the …scal burden. 2 As the …rst quotation illustrates, this interdependence between monetary and …scal policies is well understood by policymakers, even if it is not always so bluntly spelled out.
In both cases that we have outlined, the private sector believes that the two authorities are working together to implement policies that are coordinated to attain an appropriate in ‡ation rate. Nevertheless, a third scenario in which the private sector expects that policymakers will follow non-coordinated policies could also arise. Speci…cally, the …scal authority keeps postponing inde…nitely the necessary …scal adjustments, while the monetary authority insists 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 that in ‡ation stability will be preserved, remaining credibly committed to raise interest rates to combat in ‡ation. 3 This policy mix is not coordinated, re ‡ecting a disagreement between the two authorities on whether in ‡ation should or should not be used to stabilize debt. This third scenario is still not fully understood. In this paper, we investigate the macroeconomic consequences of the lack of coordination between the monetary and …scal authorities when there are large …scal imbalances.
There are several reasons that make the lack of monetary and …scal policy coordination particularly relevant. Currently, the U.S. public debt is on an unstable path. Figure 1 shows the projected dynamics of the federal debt as a percentage share of gross domestic product (GDP) under current law by the Congressional Budget O¢ ce (CBO) as of August 2016. This picture strongly suggests that …scal sustainability is far from being accomplished. Population aging and lower expected potential growth contribute to this gloomy outlook. Furthermore, U.S. debt is at its highest level since the beginning of the Korean War in 1950, suggesting that economic growth alone is unlikely to be enough to guarantee its sustainability without …scal adjustments. As of now, no plan has been announced to reduce this severe …scal imbalance. Given the explosive dynamics of U.S. debt, delaying …scal consolidation will call for more sizable corrective measures up to the point where the private sector could become skeptical that such massive adjustments can be realistically implemented. Similarly, uncertainty about the potential growth rate of the U.S. economy after the Great Recession compounds the problem by making it harder to precisely quantify how large the corrective measures have to be. 4 If the U.S. government overestimates the potential economic growth rate, the …scal adjustment alone may be considered insu¢ cient by the public, calling for an increase in in ‡ation accommodated by the Federal Reserve. That said, as the second quotation at the beginning suggests, the Federal Reserve seems committed not to give up on in ‡ation stabilization, especially in situations of high uncertainty about what the …scal authority is expected to do.
We …rst introduce a simple frictionless Fisherian model to review the role of monetary and …scal policy coordination in determining in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations. When this coordination entails that the …scal authority disregards the level of government debt and the monetary authority de-emphasizes in ‡ation stabilization, in ‡ation expectations adjust to ensure that real public debt is on a stable path. This simple model allows us to derive a closed-form analytical relationship between real government debt and in ‡ation expectations. Furthermore, this simple model proves to be useful in highlighting the key mechanisms at play when policymakers temporarily fail to coordinate. We show that if the …scal authority withdraws its backing from the monetary authority by disregarding the level of public debt, every attempt at …ghting in ‡ation by the central bank ends up generating even larger …scal imbalances, which, in turn, heighten the path of in ‡ation. This result suggests that the monetary authority cannot control in ‡ation if the …scal authority is not credibly committed to making the necessary …scal adjustments. Indeed, without a credible commitment to provide …scal backing, any attempt by the central bank to control in ‡ation is not only ine¤ective, but also counterproductive, leading to even higher in ‡ation and an economic slowdown.
We then build a more elaborate model with nominal rigidities by extending the basic new-Keynesian framework to include a …scal rule, policy uncertainty, and the possibility of discrete negative demand shocks that occasionally trigger large recessions and debt accumulation. We use this model to show that the lack of policy coordination can be highly detrimental. For instance, if agents expect that the …scal authority will disregard the level of debt but the monetary authority will insist that in ‡ation will not be allowed to rise, the economy can go through a spiral of lower output, higher in ‡ation, and higher debt. When such an institutional con ‡ict emerges, agents expect that in ‡ation will eventually increase because of the rising …scal imbalances. The central bank raises the interest rate to keep in ‡ation at bay. However, this action causes the …scal burden to become larger, inducing agents to expect even higher in ‡ation. In this case, hawkish monetary policy not only is unable to keep in ‡ation low, but also has the perverse e¤ect of signi…cantly depressing economic activity. When this scenario materializes, changes in agents'beliefs about the resolution of the con ‡ict represent an additional source of 4 A recent article in the New York Times argues that President Donald Trump and the Federal Reserve have di¤erent view about the potential growth rate for the U.S. economy. See Appelbaum (2017) . The Federal Reserve has continuously revised down its expectations for future growth since the end of the Great Recession (Leubsdorf 2016) , highlighting the high uncertainty about the long-run growth of the U.S. economy.
volatility.
These results should also make apparent why the lack of policy coordination has not been extensively studied in the context of general equilibrium models such as the one presented in this paper. As we have explained, a lack of coordination may lead to explosive dynamics for in ‡ation, output, and debt. While explosive dynamics are in principle compatible with the solution of general equilibrium models, non-stationary solutions are generally ruled out when studying models approximated around a steady state. Speci…cally, the policy combination that we are interested in would lead to non-existence of stationary solutions if we were to consider a model without policy changes, in which the explosive dynamics would persist inde…nitely (see Leeper 1991.) In this paper we make progress on this issue by introducing the possibility of changes in the policy mix and leveraging the recent advancements in the literature on solution methods for rational expectation models with parameter instability. These new solution methods allow for the possibility of temporarily explosive dynamics as long as the system as a whole remains stationary. This requires checking the frequency with which such explosive regimes manifest themselves. We elaborate more on this point later in the paper.
We then devote the last part of the paper to showing that the adverse consequences of the institutional con ‡ict can be avoided if policymakers accept to in ‡ate away just the portion of debt accumulated during the large contraction. In this scenario, policymakers concede that the post-recession debt is likely to be too large to be stabilized by …scal adjustments alone and they are prepared to accept just enough in ‡ation to stabilize the portion of debt resulting from the large recession itself. Such policy has the important feature of separating the problem of long-run …scal sustainability from the need for stabilization policies in the aftermath of a large contraction. We …nd that this strategy raises short-term in ‡ation expectations and, hence, mitigates the recession by lowering the real interest rate. Since the recession is attenuated, public debt rises only moderately and so does in ‡ation given that only a small …scal imbalance needs to be stabilized. Given that the policy clearly separates long-run …scal sustainability from short-run …scal interventions, the pre-existing …scal burden does not contribute to create long-run in ‡ationary pressures and macroeconomic instability. Finally, once the initial contractionary shock is fully reabsorbed, the economy naturally reverts to the pre-crisis policies and macroeconomic outcomes. As a methodological contribution, we show how to model this type of coordinated strategy based on endogenous targets in dynamic general equilibrium models.
If followed systematically, this strategy is shown to be particularly useful when large de ‡ationary shocks cause the nominal interest rate to hit its lower bound. By promising to in ‡ate away the debt resulting from exceptionally large recessions, the proposed strategy works like an automatic stabilizer that raises in ‡ation expectations exactly when monetary policy would otherwise become constrained by the zero lower bound. In this respect, our work is related to Woodford (2003) and Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2002) who show that liquid-ity traps can be made …scally unsustainable. Furthermore, the coordinated strategy that we propose shares some features with the policy interventions that Chris Sims has advocated at the 2016 Jackson Hole meeting to replace ine¤ective monetary policy at the zero lower bound (Sims 2016 ). Sims calls for central banks "to explain that …scal, as well as monetary policy should be aimed at meeting in ‡ation targets. This means, speci…cally, stating that in ‡ation will intentionally be at least part of the means for …nancing current debt and de…cits."In fact, our coordinated strategy can be implemented by explicitly announcing a target for the debtto-GDP ratio that the …scal authority pledges to repay through …scal adjustments. No …scal plans are instead provided to stabilize the o¤-target amount of the debt-to-GDP ratio, which policymakers have agreed to in ‡ate away.
This paper belongs to a research agenda that aims to understand the role of …scal policy in explaining changes in the reduced form properties of the macroeconomy. show that the Great In ‡ation of the 1970s can be explained in light of a …scally-led regime. The absence of …scal backing explains the failed disin ‡ationary attempts of the 1970s. Bianchi and Melosi (2013) introduce the notion of dormant shocks that are …scal shocks that raise in ‡ation many years after they occurred. Bianchi and Melosi (2017) show that policy uncertainty about the way debt will be stabilized empirically accounts for the lack of de ‡ation in the United States during the Great Recession. This paper di¤ers from the aforementioned contributions in several ways. We focus on the perils related to a lack of coordination between the monetary and …scal authorities when there is a large …scal imbalance. We emphasize that the possibility of this type of institutional con ‡icts now or in the future can challenge the central bank's ability to keep in ‡ation stable and represents a serious drag on economy activity. Furthermore, we show how policymakers can spark an increase in in ‡ation expectations and stimulate economic activity by using a coordinated policy strategy. Finally, we explain how to build shock-speci…c rules, as a technical contribution. This method is general, and, it is of independent interest.
Our work is related to the vast literature that studies the interaction between monetary and …scal policies in determining in ‡ation dynamics (Sargent and Wallace 1981; Leeper 1991; Sims 1994; Woodford 1994 Woodford , 1995 Woodford , 2001 Cochrane 1998 Cochrane , 2001 Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2000; Bassetto 2002; Eggertsson, 2008; Reis 2016 ; among many others). Most of this literature is focused on the US economy, but Jarociński and Maćkowiak (2017) study the implications of di¤erent monetary and …scal policy coordination schemes for achieving determinacy of a unique rational expectations equilibrium in the model that captures the salient features of the Euro Area. Our focus is on the US economy, but we believe that some of our results are also relevant for other countries. Del Negro and Sims (2015) argue that when the central bank's balance sheet is large and composed of long-duration nominal assets, …scal support to the balance sheet would be appropriate to allow the monetary authority to control in ‡ation. This sort of support is di¤erent from what we call …scal backing in this paper, which is required for keeping in ‡ation stable regardless of the level of the central bank's balance sheet. Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2010) study how to resolve the "unfounded liabilities problem,"which stems from the unsustainable exponential growth in the Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid spending with no plan to …nance it. They provide a coordinated resolution of this long-term …scal imbalance, which requires specifying a probability distribution for monetary and …scal behavior over a long time span. The emphasis in our paper is instead on the lack of coordination between the monetary and …scal authorities and on how to reconcile the bene…ts of short-run stabilization policies with the need for long-run …scal sustainability. While Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2015) study the macroeconomic e¤ects of changes in the magnitude of …scal shocks, we focus on the e¤ects of uncertainty about the future monetary and …scal policy mix.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a simple Fisherian model to study the implications of monetary and …scal policy coordination for price dynamics. The simplicity of this model and the absence of policy uncertainty allow us to derive all results analytically. The New Keynesian model with policy uncertainty is introduced in Section 3. In Section 4, we calibrate the New Keynesian model and simulate the e¤ects of expecting a lack of coordination between the monetary and …scal authority. The coordinated strategy and its implications are studied in Section 5. In Section 6, we present our conclusions.
A Simple Model of In ‡ation Determination
We construct a simple model to lay the groundwork for how monetary and …scal policies jointly determine equilibrium dynamics for in ‡ation. This model draws from previous studies by Leeper (1991) ; Leeper and Walker (2013) ; Sims (1994) ; Woodford (2001) .
Deterministic economy
Let us …rst consider a deterministic economy populated by in…nitely many households and a government. An in…nitely lived representative household has concave and twice continuously di¤erentiable preferences over non-storable consumption goods. The household is endowed with a constant quantity of non-storable goods Y and derives utility U ( ) from consuming these goods C t . The government issues one-period debt (liabilities) to households that can trade them for one unit of the goods at price P t . Government liabilities have purchase price Q t < 1. The government raises real net surpluses t (net to the returns paid on the debt outstanding) to repay its maturing liabilities. In symbols, the government budget constraint reads as follows:
Market clearing requires C t = Y in every period and the households'Euler equation implies the Fisher equation:
where < 1 is the households'discount factor.
The two-period case. Let us assume that the households live only two periods, implying that the government cannot sell new debt in the …nal period, B 2 = 0. For a given time sequence of net real surpluses f 1 ; 2 g and nominal debts (B 0 ; B 1 ), the government's budget constraint pins down the price level: 5
(2)
Thus, for a given sequence of primary surpluses/de…cits, the larger the stock of debt at the end of the previous period, the higher the price level in a period. The …nal period's budget constraint is particularly illustrative. This equation illustrates that for a given primary surplus that the government is able to raise in the …nal period, the larger the stock of debt outstanding at the beginning of the period, the higher the price of consumption goods (relative to government liabilities/bonds) in that period; P 2 . The government is issuing too much debt with respect to its ability to raise real resources to repay it. Thus, the relative price of the less abundant consumption goods to the abundant government debt has to go up to clear the market.
The in…nite-period case. We can use the Fisher equation to get rid of bond price Q t in the government budget constraint. We obtain
For a given a sequence of debts and real primary surpluses fB t ; t g, the ‡ow government budget constraint equation (4) determines the equilibrium dynamics of the price level conditional on the initial price level P 1 . If one knew this initial price level P 1 , one could use these equations to pin down the equilibrium sequence of the price levels fP 2 ; P 3 ; :::g. To determine the price level we need to take an extra step. The transversality condition for government bonds, which ensures that consumers willingly hold debt, requires the present value of debt to equal zero. 6 Imposing this condition on government behavior results in the intertemporal 5 Note that the price of government bonds Q 1 is determined by the price level in the two periods via the Fisher equation. 6 The transversality condition for government bonds is
We rule out hyperin ‡ation and hyperde ‡ation. Such price processes would imply explosive real balance and real debt paths that violate transversality. budget constraint:
A higher initial debt B 0 or a stream of smaller real primary surpluses f t g raises the price level. The real value of debt (i.e., its value in terms of consumption goods) is given by the discounted stream of future primary real surpluses that the government is able to generate. A higher initial debt B 0 must be backed by future higher real surpluses. Otherwise, consumption goods are relatively less abundant than government debt and, hence, the price level P 1 has to go up to clear the market where goods and government liabilities are traded. Notice that as long as the real return to government debt is constant (or exogenous), the link between in ‡ation and …scal imbalances stems from the intertemporal budget constraint. The other model equations do not interfere with this mechanism.
A stochastic environment with monetary and …scal policy
We now move to introduce a richer setting in order to understand how monetary and …scal policies jointly determine the price level. Let us assume that the discount factor is a¤ected by an exogenous process d t that follows an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) zeromean exogenous process: E d t = 0. The problem for the representative household reads as follows
subject to the ‡ow budget constraint P t C t + Q t B t + P t t = P t Y + B t 1 with Q t < 1. Solving the household's problem yields the Fisher equation:
Furthermore, we introduce a monetary authority that controls the nominal interest rate on government bond R t = Q 1 t by using the rule
where the starred variables denote the value of the variables at the deterministic steady state. This equation describes monetary policy and ties the changes in the nominal rate to in ‡ation deviations from its steady-state value. We refer to equations (6) and (7) as the monetary block of this simple economy.
The government budget constraint equation (1) can be equivalently rewritten as
where b t B t =P t denotes the real value of the government liabilities at time t. The government's ability or willingness to raise primary real surpluses t across periods is captured by the following …scal rule (expressed in real terms):
where t follows an i.i.d. zero-mean exogenous process: E ( t ) = 0. Note that according to this simple …scal rule, the government adjusts primary surpluses to respond to the previous period's real stock of debt. We refer to equations (8) and (9) as the …scal block of the economy. We linearized the model equations around the steady-state equilibrium. The Fisher equation (6) and the monetary rule (7) can be expressed as follows:
The two equations that make up the …scal block can be written as follows:
where we use e x to denote the log-deviation of a variable x from its steady-state value, whereas we use b
x to denote its linear deviation from the steady state. Note that we linearize the primary surplus t and the real debt b t around the steady state as these variables can potentially be negative. In what follows, we always assume that the steady-state real debt is positive (b > 0).
Equation (12) highlights the two key links between monetary and …scal policy. The …rst link is captured by the interest rate appearing on the right-hand side of equation (12): A monetary tightening brings about …scal imbalances. The second link is captured by the in ‡ation term appearing on the right-hand side of equation (12): A fall (rise) in in ‡ation raises (reduces) the real burden of government debt. These two links make monetary policy and …scal policy interdependent. Notice that both in ‡ation~ t and the nominal interest rateR t are multiplied by the magnitude of the steady-state stock of real debt b in equation (12) . Therefore, the larger the average value of …scal imbalances, the stronger the degree of interdependence between monetary and …scal policy. As argued in the introduction, policymakers are aware of this interdependence. As we shall see, these links play a central role in determining whether there exists a unique stable rational expectations equilibrium (determinacy), or in…nitely many of them (indeterminacy), or none of them in our simple model.
Plugging the monetary rule (11) into the Fisher equation (10) yields the following equation:
which we will refer to as the monetary-block equation. Furthermore, combining equation (12) with the …scal rule (13) and the monetary rule (11) yieldŝ
which we will refer to as the …scal-block equation. Notice that whether higher in ‡ation reduces or increases the real stock of debt primarily depends on how strongly the monetary authority responds to in ‡ation ( ). In ‡ation raises real debt if the central bank aggressively raises the interest rate in response to in ‡ation deviations from the target ( > 1 ). This rise in the interest rate ends up increasing the …scal burden by making its serving cost larger via the …rst link that we discussed when presenting equation (12). This is an important point to which we will return. De…ning the rational expectations errors t ~ t E t 1~ t and replacing~ t with E t 1~ t + t in both equations (14)-(15) yield the following system of linear equations:
This system has two eigenvalues: and 1 . There is only one non-predetermined variable (E t~ t+1 ). Since the second eigenvalue lies outside the unit circle if < 1 1, our exercise con…rms the partition of the parameter space introduced by Leeper (1991) : The two policy parameters and determine these eigenvalues and, hence, the existence and uniqueness of a stable rational expectations equilibrium for this Fisherian economy. Let us review the four possible cases.
Monetary-Led Policy Mix. Suppose that the monetary authority conducts an active monetary policy by aggressively adjusting the interest rate to stabilize in ‡ation. This policy is captured by setting > 1 in the monetary policy rule (7). Furthermore, let us assume that the government is committed to generate enough primary surpluses so as to stabilize the real stock of debtb t . This goal is achieved by assuming that the …scal authority adjusts primary surpluses to debt ‡uctuations in a way to guarantee that debt always remains on a stable path. More precisely, if the …scal policy parameter is larger than 1 1, then the root 1 in the …scal-block equation (15) is lower than one, which implies stationary dynamics for the real debtb t . When policymakers follow this policy mix, there exists a unique stable rational expectations equilibrium. 7 It should be noted that this kind of monetary and …scal policy interactions leads policymakers to coordinate their policies in a countercyclical manner. As an in ‡ationary shock (e.g., d t > 0) hits the economy, the central bank aggressively raises the interest rate. This aggressive monetary contraction leads to an increase in the debt service costs ({ t ) -equation (15)and hence to a …scal imbalance. The …scal rule implies that the …scal authority raises taxes aggressively ( > 1 1) to make sure that the higher real stock of debt will be reabsorbed. The opposite happens after a de ‡ationary shock. We call this form of interaction monetaryled policy mix meaning that the monetary authority is the leading authority, while the …scal authority accommodates monetary policy decisions by adjusting primary surpluses in a way to keep debt on a stable path.
In our simple setting it is possible to characterize analytically the unique rational expectations equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the law of motion for in ‡ation is as follows:
Combining this result with the …scal-block equation (15) delivers the equilibrium law of motion of real debtb t . Equation (17) reveals an important property of this equilibrium: …scal shocks t do not a¤ect in ‡ation; they only a¤ect …scal variables (i.e., debt and primary surpluses). Since the …scal authority is committed to systematically adjusting the stream of primary surpluses to repay its debt, in ‡ation is completely insulated from the …scal block and …scal imbalances are never relevant for in ‡ation determination. We call this feature Monetary and Fiscal Dichotomy. Again, the Dichotomy requires to assume that (i) the central bank strives to stabilize in ‡ation, (ii) the government is committed to raise taxes to stabilize debt, and (iii) agents believe that policymakers will carry out these policies in every state of the world.
Fiscally-Led Policy Mix. Now suppose that the government is not committed to raise enough primary surpluses so as to guarantee …scal sustainability. This scenario is captured by setting the …scal policy parameter in the …scal rule (9) strictly lower than the steady-state value of the net real rate 1 1 . Furthermore, we assume that the monetary authority conducts a passive monetary policy by weakly adjusting the interest rate to stabilize in ‡ation. This policy is captured by setting 1 in the monetary policy rule (7). Now the root 1 in the …scal-block equation (15) is larger than one, which implies that the government is not taking the necessary …scal adjustments to stabilize the debt. Therefore, when debt deviates from its value of steady state, agents want to sell government liabilities in exchange for consumption goods. They understand that the government will not repay debt with consumption goods. Consequently, the price of consumption goods must go up to clear the market.
However, for this scenario to be consistent with a stable equilibrium, the behavior of the central bank plays a key role. By responding to in ‡ation less than one to one, the central bank accommodates the price adjustment that is necessary to stabilize the dynamics of real debt. 8 As a result, the dynamics of the forward-looking variable (i.e., in ‡ation expectations) are pinned down by the need for making real debt stationary. Hence, there exists a unique stable rational expectations equilibrium. In this simple framework, the relationship between in ‡ation expectations and the deviations of real debt from its steady state can be analytically characterized: 9
This equation quanti…es by how much in ‡ation expectations have to adjust to keep real debt on a stable path and to ensure the uniqueness of the stable rational expectations equilibria. Furthermore, this equation is quite revealing about the interplay between monetary and …scal policies. The active …scal authority can disregard the level of debt because the passive monetary authority allows in ‡ation to rise to stabilize ‡uctuations in the real value of debt. We call this policy mix …scally-led policy mix. Quite clearly, equation (18) breaks down the Monetary and Fiscal Dichotomy. Now in ‡ation is no longer insulated from …scal developments.
The rational expectation equilibrium (REE) can be characterized by plugging equation (18) into the monetary-block equation (14) to get rid of in ‡ation expectations. We obtain
capturing the response of the expected in ‡ation needed to stabilize the real stock of debt, as illustrated by equation (18). Combining equation (19) with the …scalblock equation (15) yields a system of linear equations that can be solved by simply inverting a 2 2 matrix. Some tedious but straightforward algebra allows us to characterize the unique REE solution under the PM/AF policy mix: 10
Two features of the solution (20) are worthy emphasizing. First, as already noticed, in ‡ation is generally not insulated from …scal shocks t under this alternative policy mix. Second, the central bank's systematic response to in ‡ation ( ) induces the dynamics of debt and, hence, in ‡ation to become persistent. This is strikingly di¤erent from the monetary-led case, in which in ‡ation follows an i.i.d. process. Notice that this simple Fisherian model features only i.i.d. shocks. The persistent dynamics of in ‡ation under the …scally-led policy mix entirely stem from monetary contractions in response to in ‡ation that occur so long as > 0. These timid monetary contractions end up slowing down the in ‡ation-driven reduction in the real value of debt and, in doing so, raise the amount of in ‡ation that is necessary for stabilizing debt, everything else being equal.
Passive Monetary and Fiscal Policies. So far we have considered situations in which policies are coordinated, in the sense that they are conducive to a unique equilibrium. These situations always re ‡ect an explicit or implicit agreement between the monetary and …scal authorities about the appropriate path of in ‡ation and debt in every state of the world. In what follows, we are going to consider the possibility of a lack of coordination between the two authorities. By this we mean a situation in which the two authorities follow policies that are not conducive to a unique path for in ‡ation and real debt.
The …rst possibility we consider is that both authorities engage in passive policies. This means that the monetary authority disapplies the Taylor principle ( 1) and the …scal authority adjusts the stream of future primary surpluses to stabilize debt ( 1 1). This policy mix is not coordinated because monetary policy fails to anchor in ‡ation expectations while …scal policy does not require in ‡ation to reabsorb …scal imbalances, which are addressed by raising primary surpluses. As a result, in ‡ation is indeterminate; that is, there exist in…nitely many stable paths for in ‡ation that are consistent with the concept of rational expectations equilibrium.
Lack of Coordination and Policy Changes
Let us now consider the case that is the focus of this paper. Suppose that the central bank applies the Taylor principle ( > 1) and that the …scal authority disregards the level of debt ( < 1 1). In this case, monetary and …scal policies are not coordinated in the sense that monetary and …scal policies are not geared toward the determination of the in ‡ation rate. Rather, the two policy authorities are in a sort of con ‡ict to control in ‡ation: the lack of response of the …scal authority to the level of debt would call for debt stabilization via in ‡ation, whereas the central bank adjusts the interest rate aggressively to prevent in ‡ation from deviating from its steady-state (target) level. These two policies are clearly inconsistent. If this lack of coordination were to persist inde…nitely, no stable rational expectations equilibrium would exist. However, this policy mix is still consistent with a stable equilibrium if it is not perceived to be permanent. In what follows, we use the simple Fisherian model to study the macroeconomic implications of a situation in which both monetary and …scal authorities conduct active policies in a struggle to control in ‡ation.
We assume that the economy is at its steady-state equilibrium when at time t = 1, it is hit by a positive discount factor shock, d t > 0. At this point, the …scal authority starts disregarding the level of debt = A < 1 1 while the monetary authority is conducting an active policy ( = A > 1). We can interpret this policy mix with both authorities active as a situation in which there is con ‡ict over the in ‡ation rate. On the one hand, the central bank wants to secure full control over in ‡ation, preventing …scal imbalances from having any e¤ects on in ‡ation dynamics. On the other hand, the …scal authority wants the central bank to let in ‡ation adjust so as to stabilize its real debt.
We assume that one of the two authorities will eventually have to concede the control of in ‡ation in period t = 2 and revert to the passive policy. We consider two cases: one in which the monetary authority wins ( = A > 1 and = P > 1 1 in period t = 2) and the other in which the …scal authority eventually prevails ( = P < 1 and = A < 1 1 in period t = 2). To make our analysis as simple as possible, we assume that agents know with certainty what policy mix is adopted by policymakers at time t = 1 and in every subsequent period. Later on we will relax this assumption.
Case 1 Con ‡ict and Monetary-Led Resolution
In this case, the monetary authority is not adjusting its behavior in response to the …scal authority's decision to withdraw its …scal backing. In period t = 2, the …scal authority will revert to passive …scal policy. This case is illustrative of a situation in which agents expect that after the initial period of con ‡ict with the …scal authority, the central bank will succeed in securing …scal backing, a necessary condition for controlling in ‡ation.
At time t = 1; agents anticipate that policymakers will eventually coordinate their policies in line with the monetary-led policy mix and hence, at time t = 2 in ‡ation will depend only on future shocks (see equation (17).) Since the discount factor shock is i.i.d., it follows that E 1~ 2 = 0. Consequently, REE in ‡ation at time 1 is given by~ 1 = 1 A d 1 > 0. Since the real debt is at steady state at time t = 0, plugging the equilibrium in ‡ation rate at time t = 1 into the …scal-block equation (15) yields the real debt at time t = 1, which isb 1 = b 1
Notice that …scal authority's actions have no implications whatsoever for REE outcomes in period 1. Agents understand that the …scal authority has withdrawn its backing only in the short term and soon it will revert to passive policy. Importantly, the …scal imbalance that arises in period 1 does not in ‡uence the dynamics of in ‡ation at time t = 1 and in any subsequent period. The stronger the monetary authority responds to in ‡ation (i.e., the higher A ), the lower in ‡ation in period 1. A proactive central bank will induce a larger …scal imbalance, requiring the government to raise taxes more aggressively from period 2 onward. When the central bank's response to in ‡ation is su¢ ciently strong, A > 1 1, real debt responds positively to the in ‡ationary shock. This result is due to the …scal e¤ects of the contractionary monetary policy conducted in the …rst period.
Case 2: Con ‡ict and Fiscally-Led Resolution In this case, policymakers compete for to gain full control over how to determine the rate of in ‡ation in the …rst period, but unlike in case 1, the …scal authority is expected to emerge victorious. This case sheds light on what happens when the central bank …ghts back against the …scal authority's decision to remove its support for stabilizing in ‡ation, but agents expect that …scal backing will not be secured in the long run.
At time t = 1; agents know that policymakers will coordinate over their policies in line with the Fiscally-led policy mix, and hence, they expect that E 1^ 2 = b 1 . Consequently, at time t = 1, the REE in ‡ation must satisfy~
and the stock of real debtb
We can solve the linear system of equations (21)-(22) and obtaiñ
: As explained earlier, this term captures the response of in ‡ation expectations that is necessary to stabilize the real stock of debt under the …scally-led regime. This is a slightly more complex equilibrium to analyze than the previous ones because both authorities'actions play some role in shaping macroeconomic outcomes. In particular, unlike in case 1, …scal policy can now a¤ect in ‡ation outcomes. To simplify the analysis, let us assume that the government does not respond at all to the real debt; that is, A = 0. In this case, one can use the fact that b = 1 to simplify the equilibrium equations (23)-(24). It then follows that in ‡ation in period t = 1 is equal to d 1 and is therefore totally una¤ected by the monetary authority's actions. The important lesson is that independent of how strongly the central bank responds to the in ‡ationary consequences of the discount factor shock during the con ‡ict period (t = 1), in ‡ation raises by the …xed amount d t . Furthermore, it should be noted that real debt also rises after the shock because A > 1 . 11 As in case 1, this increase is due to the active monetary policy: to control in ‡ation the monetary authority raises the interest rate, which in turn determines an increase in the service cost of debt. Even more importantly, a more aggressive monetary policy during the con ‡ict period causes a higher …scal imbalance, which in turn brings about a higher in ‡ation rate in the following period. The more hawkish monetary policy is during the con ‡ict period (i.e., the higher A ), the larger the stock of real debt at the end of period 1 because monetary tightening raises the interest paid on government debt.
If the central bank keeps responding to in ‡ation in the post-con ‡ict period ( P > 0), then the hawkish policy strategy taken during the con ‡ict period leads to a persistently higher path of in ‡ation afterward. To see this, recall that from period t = 2 onward, the dynamics of in ‡ation and real debt are determined by equation (20). As explained earlier, the central bank's (timid) response to in ‡ation ( P > 0) during the post-con ‡ict period induces persistent 11 Note that if A = 0, then equation (24) 
in ‡ation dynamics. Figure 2 illustrates these three results by showing the propagation of an in ‡ationary shock for a set of central bank's responses to in ‡ation in period 1, A 2 f1:5; 2:0; 2:5g, and for a set of passive responses in subsequent periods, P 2 f0; 0:5g (left and right plots, respectively). We set the discount factor = 0:9901. Furthermore, we assume that the steady-state debtto-output ratio b is equal to 0:6 and the …scal authority's active response ( A ) is equal to 0.
The key lesson that we learn from this simple model goes as follows: If agents expect that the central bank has lost …scal backing permanently, hawkish monetary policy back…res. Hawkish monetary policy not only fails to lower in ‡ation during the con ‡ict period, but also ends up delivering higher in ‡ation in the post-con ‡ict periods because it generates an increase in the stock of debt that needs to be stabilized by in ‡ation. As we shall see subsequently, this key lesson also applies to richer models.
A New-Keynesian Model
In this section we build a more elaborate model by extending the basic new-Keynesian model employed by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) , Woodford (2003) , Galí (2008) , and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) to include a …scal rule, the possibility of occasionally large recession episodes that are associated with sizable debt accumulation, and uncertainty about the post-recession monetary and …scal policy mix. The economy consists of a continuum of monopolistic …rms, a representative household, and a monetary authority (or central bank). Some of the elements of the model are similar to the ones used in Bianchi and Melosi (2017) . This will allow us to calibrate the model by borrowing some of the parameters estimated in that paper that featured changes in the monetary and …scal policy mix and the possibility of large preference shocks. However, the key distinctive feature of the current model the possibility of con ‡icts between policymakers was not contemplated in that paper. The results that follow are robust to using simpler or richer versions of the New-Keynesian model. The key ingredients are the presence of nominal rigidities, to create a link between in ‡ation and real activity, and changes in policymakers'behavior, to create the possibility of a con ‡ict between the monetary and …scal authorities.
The Model
Households. Households derive utility from consumption C t and disutility from labor h t :
where is the household's discount factor. The preference shock d is the sum of a continuous and discrete component:
The continuous component d t follows an AR(1) process:
can assume two values: high or low (d h or d l ). The variable d t controls the regime in place and evolves according to the transition matrix H d :
where p ji = P d t+1 = jj d t = i . Henceforth, when the the variable d t = h and, hence, d d t = d h , we say that the economy is in the high state of demand. Conversely, when the the variable d t = l and, hence, d d t = d l , we say that the economy is in the low state of demand. This speci…cation is in the spirit of Christiano et al. (2011) . However, in the current setup shocks to preferences are assumed to be recurrent, and agents take into account that these episodes can lead to unusual responses from policymakers, as discussed later on. The household budget constraint is given by:
where D t stands for real dividends paid by the …rms, P t is government of consumption good, h t is hours, W t is the real wage, T t is taxes, and T R t stands for transfers. Following Woodford (2001) , we assume that there are two types of government bonds: one-period government debt, B s t , in zero net supply with price P s t ; and a more general portfolio of government debt, B m t , in non-zero net supply with price P m t . The former debt instrument satis…es P s t = R 1 t . The latter debt instrument has the payment structure T (t+1) for T > t and 0 < < 1. The asset can be interpreted as a portfolio of in…nitely many bonds with an average maturity controlled by the parameter . The value of such an instrument issued in period t in any future period t + j is P m j t+j = j P m t+j . Firms. The representative …rm j faces a downward-sloping demand curve with price elasticity 1= :
Y t through a standard CES aggregator function. Whenever a …rm changes its price, it faces a quadratic adjustment cost:
where t = P t =P t 1 is gross in ‡ation at time t and is the corresponding deterministic steady state. Shocks to the elasticity of substitution imply shocks to the markup @ t = 1= (1 t ) : We assume that the rescaled markup t = log (@ t =@) follows an autoregressive process, t = t 1 + ;t , where 1 ' 2 is the slope of the Phillips curve. The …rm chooses the price P t (j) to maximize the present value of future pro…ts:
where Q s is the stochastic discount factor for the representative household. Labor is the only input in the …rm production function, Y t (j) = A t h 1 t (j), where total factor productivity A t evolves according to an exogenous process: ln (A t =A t 1 ) = + a t , a t = a a t 1 + a a;t , a;t N (0; 1). Firms take as given the general price level, P t , the equilibrium real wages, W t , and the level of real activity, Y t .
Government. Imposing the restriction that one-period debt is in zero net supply, the ‡ow budget constraint of the government is given by:
Let us denote the government transfers as a fraction of nominal output as tr t . The linearized transfers as a fraction of nominal output, e tr t ; is assumed to follow e tr t e tr t = tr e tr t 1 e tr t + (1 tr ) y (b y t b y t ) + tr tr;t ; e tr t = tr e tr t 1 + tr tr ;t ; tr ;t N (0; 1) ; tr;t N (0; 1) ;
where e tr t represents a long-term component that is meant to capture the large programs that arise as the result of a political process that is not modeled here. 12 Transfers move around this trend component as a result of business cycle ‡uctuations captured by the log-linearized output gap (b y t b y t ), where b y t is potential output in log-deviations from it steady-state value. Potential output is de…ned as the output that would arise under ‡exible prices and no markup shocks. The government also buys a fraction G t =Y t of total output. We de…ne g t 1=(1 G t =Y t ), and we 12 In what follows, b
x t denotes the log-deviations of a (stationary) variable from its steady-state value. For all the variables normalized with respect to nominal output (debt, expenditure, transfers, and taxes), e
x t denotes linear deviations from the steady state. assume thatĝ t ln(g t =g) follows an autoregressive process:ĝ t = gĝ t 1 + g g;t ; g;t N (0; 1) :
Policy Rules. The monetary policy rule reads as follows:
where R is the steady-state gross nominal interest rate and is the deterministic steady-state level for gross in ‡ation. The parameters ; p t and y; p t capture the central bank's response to in ‡ation and the output gap, which depends on the policy mix p t in place at time t. As explained in the next section, the policy mix in place will also depend on the state of demand that, in turn, is controlled by d t . The …scal authority sets taxes according to the following rule:
where e t is the level of tax-revenues-to-GDP ratio in linear deviations from the steady state. The parameter b; p t captures the …scal authority's attitude toward debt stabilization, which depends on the type of policy mix p t in place at time t. Even for the …scal rule, the policy rule in place will also depend on the state of demand that, in turn, is controlled by d t .
Policy Regimes
The Markov-switching process p t determines the policy mix conditional on the state of demand d t . This exogenous variable captures in reduced form the complex interplay between the monetary and …scal authorities. The fact that the state of demand is discrete makes it easier to condition the type of monetary and …scal policies adopted, which is captured by p t , on the state of demand, which is captured by d t . Agents are rational, and they understand that recessions and expansions a¤ects the way in which the monetary and …scal authorities coordinate their policies.
When the state of the demand is high ( d t = d h ), three possible policy mixes can arise depending on p t . Policymakers can conduct a monetary-led policy mix ( p t = M ), with monetary policy geared toward in ‡ation stabilization ( = ;M > 1) and …scal policy aimed at adjusting primary surpluses to stabilize the debt-to-output ratio ( b = b;M > 1 1). When demand is high, policymakers can also follow a …scally-led policy mix ( p t = F ), with the monetary authority that de-emphasizes in ‡ation stabilization ( = ;F 1) and the …scal authority that disregards the level of debt ( b = b;F 1 1). Finally, a non-coordinated (or con ‡ict) policy mix ( p t = C) can arise, with the monetary authority that is resolute in his commitment to stabilize in ‡ation ( = ;C > 1) and the …scal authority that disregards debt stabilization ( b = b;C 1 1). As shown in the Fisherian model, the third policy mix leads to no stable rational expectations equilibria when considered in isolation. 13 In this case, the government would like in ‡ation to adjust to stabilize debt, whereas the central bank does not want to let in ‡ation go up. Thus, this regime captures the possibility that the monetary and …scal authorities go through a con ‡ict over the determination of the rate of in ‡ation. We refer to this type of policy mix as non-coordinated in the sense that policymakers are not in agreement about what is the rate of in ‡ation that they see as appropriate.
When the state of demand is low ( d t = d l ), we assume that the monetary authority deemphasizes in ‡ation stabilization and the government carries out a …scal stimulus by momentarily disregarding the level of debt. Therefore, when the state of demand is low, the policy mix is …scally led ( = ;F 1 and b = b;F 1 1). It is worth clarifying that the fact that policymakers respond with the …scally-led policy mix to large recessions is not essential for the main results of this paper. However, we believe that this assumption is quite plausible, since policymakers arguably put less emphasis on in ‡ation and debt stabilization during severe economic downturns.
More formally, the joint dynamics of demand and policy regimes are captured by the following transition matrix Q:
The columns of this matrix sum to one. The matrix Q H controls the dynamics of the policy regime p t conditional on being in a high state of demand. As we discussed earlier, when the state of demand is high, the policy regime can be monetary led, …scally led, or non-coordinated. Q L is the transition matrix that governs the evolution of policy regimes during the large recession triggered by the discrete demand shock d t (the low state of demand). As we noticed before, these regimes are all characterized by the …scally-led policy mix. However, the regimes di¤er in terms of the policy mix that is likely to prevail once the negative preference shock is reabsorbed. These possible outcomes are captured by the transition matrix Q O . The matrix Q I controls the policy regime dynamics when the low state of demand materializes ( d t = d l ). This modelling framework captures rational agents'uncertainty about the response of policymakers to the potentially large accumulation of debt that occurs in response to a large contractionary shock. As we shall see, agents' beliefs about what will happen after a large recession are critical for the macroeconomic dynamics during the recession. These beliefs are captured by the matrix Q O . The remaining shocks are assumed to be small, and hence, reces- 13 Leeper's results for the Fisherian model would apply to this New Keynesian model if the policy regimes were not allowed to change. With Markov-switching, the analysis of global stability of the system is more complicated. We will focus on parameterizations that ensure mean square stability of the model (Costa, Fragoso, and Marques 2004) . sions caused by these shocks are assumed not to give rise to relevant …scal strain.
Linearization. We linearize the …scal variables around the steady state and log-linearize all the non-…scal variables. Details on how we solve the linearized model is provided in Appendix B.
Policy Con ‡icts and Solution
In this paper, we contemplate scenarios in which agents expect that the …scal authority can disregard the level of debt (active …scal policy) while the central bank remains committed to stabilizing in ‡ation (active monetary policy). We call this mix of active monetary and …scal policies non-coordinated because it is inconsistent with determining the unique path for in ‡ation. In fact, if this policy mix were followed forever, Leeper (1991) shows that there is no stable rational expectations equilibria. To see why, suppose that in ‡ation is above target and that the Federal Reserve tries to push it down by increasing the federal funds rate more than one-to-one in response to the observed deviation. This action prompts an increase in the real interest rate, a contraction in output, and, consequently, an acceleration in the rise of the debtto-output ratio. This acceleration in the dynamic of the debt-to-output ratio would require an increase in taxation, but agents know that this is not going to happen because the …scal authority is active. Therefore, the adjustment has to come through an increase in in ‡ation that triggers an even larger increase in the interest rate and so on. Clearly, the economy is on an explosive path, and if this situation were to persist, no stationary solution would exist. This explains while this scenario has been largely neglected in the study of monetary/…scal policy interactions.
However, if the con ‡ict (active monetary policy/active …scal policy) regime is expected to eventually end, the model can still admit a stable and unique rational expectations equilibrium. The model could present temporary explosive dynamics, but as long as these are not expected to last for too long, a stationary solution would still exist. This is the key insight that allows us to solve the model allowing for periods of con ‡ict by leveraging the recent advancements in the literature on solution methods for Markov-switching general equilibrium models. We use the solution algorithm proposed by Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2009) . This solution method requires the solution to satisfy mean square stability: First and second moments need to be stationary when taking into account the possibility of regime changes. However, quite importantly, the solution method does not impose that all regimes taken in isolation are stationary, allowing for temporary explosive dynamics. Given that agents form expectations by taking into account the possibility of regime changes, their expectations are still …nite at every horizon, even when the economy is temporarily on an explosive path because of the con ‡ict between the two authorities. As we shall see, the properties of the solution are determined by which authority agents expect to eventually give up by moving to a passive policy. Table 1 shows the parameter values used in this paper. We denote the probability of staying in the monetary-led, …scally-led, and con ‡ict policy mix as p M M ; p F F , and p CC , respectively. Most of the parameter values and transition probabilities are based on a previous estimation by Bianchi and Melosi (2017) . Nonetheless, the model estimated by Bianchi and Melosi (2017) does not feature non-coordinated regimes. We calibrate the probability p CC = 0:90, implying that agents expect the con ‡ict regime to last 10 quarters. Moderate changes to this parameter values in this parameter would not a¤ect the key mechanisms that will be discussed later. We assume that during the con ‡ict the central bank responds even more strongly to in ‡ation than in the monetary-led case ( ;C = 2:0 > ;M ). Furthermore, the central bank is totally focused on controlling in ‡ation and completely disregards the level of real activity y;C = 0. This parameter choice serves the important purpose of clearly showing the leading mechanisms at play when policymakers do not coordinate their policies or when they are expected not to coordinate their policies after a large recession. To induce large debt accumulation during the low state of demand, we assume that transfers adjust more strongly to business cycle conditions ( y ) than during regular business cycle ‡uctuations. These parameter choices allow us to see the e¤ects of a lack of monetary and …scal policy coordination more clearly in the graphs that follow but these choices do not a¤ect the main results of the paper. The magnitude of the negative demand shock (d l ) is three times smaller than the shock that caused the Great Recession based on the estimates of Bianchi and Melosi (2017) . We set the value of the negative demand shock to be smaller in order to avoid the issue of the zero lower bound constraint for the nominal interest rate. Increasing the magnitude of the negative discrete demand shock would strengthen the results of the paper but at the costs of making the exposition of the key mechanisms unnecessarily more complicated. The parameter b =4 denotes the steady-state debt-to-output ratio on an annualized basis whose value is estimated by Bianchi and Melosi (2017) . The other parameters do not play a key role in determining the results that follow. The table with all the parameter values is shown in Appendix C.
The E¤ects of Lack of Policy Coordination
Following Bianchi and Melosi (2017) , the probability that a large recession hits in every high-demand period is very tiny, since the probability p hh is very close to one. While this parameterization is certainly extreme, it simpli…es the analysis substantially by implying that once the economy exits the recession, the high-demand regime is de-facto an absorbing state. This choice has the advantage of clearly isolating the key mechanisms at play when we introduce the possibility of non-coordination between the monetary and …scal authorities. The value for the parameter captures the average duration of U.S. debt which is roughly …ve years. The parameter controlling the elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods, , and the parameter controlling the degree of nominal rigidities ' are not separably identi…able once the model is log-linearized and, hence, as in Bianchi and Melosi (2017) , we directly calibrate the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, , that links in ‡ation~ t to real activityŷ t . The value of is pinned down by =R, whose values are provided in Table 1 .
In this section, we use the calibrated model to run some experiments to study situations in which agents lose their trust in the government's commitment to make the necessary …scal adjustments to stabilize debt. Apart from the initial debt-to-output ratio, which is calibrated to match the U.S. debt at the end of 2016 according to the CBO (77%), we assume that all the other variables are at the steady state when the economy is hit by a negative discrete demand shock that triggers a large recession. Policymakers adopt a …scally-led policy mix in an attempt to carry out a …scal stimulus. The debt-to-output ratio increases and agents expect one of the following post-recession outcomes: (i) the government is committed to make the necessary …scal adjustments to stabilize the growing debt-to-output ratio (monetary-led policy mix); (ii) the government is not committed to stabilize the post-recession debt and the central bank is expected to accommodate the government by de-emphasizing in ‡ation stabilization (…scally-led policy mix); (iii) the government is not committed to stabilize the post-recession debt and the central bank is expected to …ght back against the …scal authority in an attempt to stabilize in ‡ation (non-coordination). This institutional con ‡ict lasts only temporarily, and agents form expectations about which authority will eventually emerge victorious from the con ‡ict. If agents expect that the …scally-led (monetary-led) policy mix will be adopted following the con ‡ict, we say that the …scal (monetary) authority is expected to prevail in the con ‡ict over the control of the rate of in ‡ation. To simplify the exposition of the results, we assume that agents'beliefs turn out to be correct.
These four possible post-recession scenarios ( p t = M , p t = F , p t = C with the …scal authority expected to win, and p t = C with the monetary authority expected to win) and the out-of-the-recession outcomes are modeled by introducing eight regimes. The …rst two regimes capture the coordinated policy mixes under the high state of demand. The third and fourth regimes are non-coordinated regimes that di¤er in their probability of moving to the monetaryled policy mix as the con ‡ict ends. The third regime is assumed to lead to the monetary-led policy mix with probability one, whereas the fourth regime is assumed to lead to the …scallyled policy mix with probability one. The four …scally-led regimes during the low state of demand di¤er on the probability of moving to the four high-demand policy combinations. This parameterization implies that during the low state of demand, agents know with certainty which policy mix will be realized once the economy moves back to the high state of demand. While this is certainly a strong assumption, it allows us to isolate the key mechanisms at work. We show how this assumption a¤ects our results in the appendix. All in all, the evolution of these eight regimes is captured by the following transition matrix for regimes ( d t , p t ):
where 1 4 4 is a 4 4 matrix of ones, I n denotes the n n identity matrix, and the dynamics of the policy regimes when the recession is over (or more precisely, when the state of demand is high d t = d h ) is given by
:
Agents take into account the possibility of large recessions and the consequent changes in policymakers'behaviors. Figure 3 shows the macroeconomic dynamics of the output gap, in ‡ation, the federal funds rate, and debt-to-GDP ratio under the following sequence of events. At time t = 0, the economy is at the steady state and the (annualized) debt-to-GDP ratio is 77:0%. At time t = 1 the economy is hit by the negative demand shock until time t = 10 ( d t = d l for 1 t 10). This low-demand period is highlighted by the dark gray area. From period t = 11 through period t = 30, the economy switches back to the high state of demand. We consider two cases. In the …rst case, during the low state of demand, agents expect that policymakers will conduct a …scally-led policy mix (coordination) once the state of demand switches back to high in period 11. This case is captured by the dashed line. In the second case, during the low state of demand, agents expect that policymakers will compete for the control over the rate of in ‡ation once the state of demand switches back to high in period 11. Furthermore, we assume that agents expect that the …scal authority will eventually prevail. In other words, when the con ‡ict ends, the central bank is expected to change policy and the policy mix becomes …scally led. This second case is captured by the solid line.
Macroeconomic Dynamics with Lack of Coordination
We assume that if it occurs, the con ‡ict regime lasts for ten quarters and then the …scallyled policy mix will stay in place from period 21 through period 30. The period of con ‡ict between the two authorities is highlighted by the light gray area in Figure 3 . Agents do not know ex-ante the exact duration of the recession (the dark gray area), how many periods the post-recession institutional con ‡ict will last (the light gray area), and how long the high state of demand will persist (the light gray area and the white area). However, agents observe the history of regimes and know their likely durations.
Con ‡ict and Fiscally-led Resolution. When agents expect an institutional con ‡ict followed by the …scally-led policy mix, agents anticipate that the large and growing stock of debt will be in ‡ated away. Hence, in ‡ation expectations and in ‡ation rise. During the con ‡ict period (11 t 20) the central bank applies the Taylor principle to rein in these in ‡ationary pressures. The monetary tightening conducted during the con ‡ict period determines an increase in real interest rates. As a result, the service cost of debt increases and the economy enters a recession. Both e¤ects of the monetary policy intervention lead to further debt accumulation, exacerbating the …scal imbalance. This, in turn, strengthens the in ‡ationary pressures because agents expect the …scal authority to eventually prevail and hence disregard debt stabilization for a long time. But higher in ‡ationary pressures call for further monetary tightening, which leads to an even larger recession and greater …scal imbalance. Therefore, when agents expect a con ‡ict between policymakers, the economy goes through a vicious spiral of higher debt, higher in ‡ation, higher interest rate, and lower real activity.
Monetary policy interventions, consequently, lead to a double-dip recession. The second recession is entirely due to policymakers'behaviors because the state of demand is high from period 11 on. Furthermore, during the …rst recession, forward-looking and rational agents anticipate the macroeconomic dynamics that will occur during the con ‡ict. Therefore, expecting an institutional con ‡ict causes the economic crisis to be more severe and gives rise to upward when a negative discrete demand shock occurs in period 1 and persists until period 10 (the dark gray area). The discrete demand shock switches back to high from period 11 through period 30. The dashed line captures the macroeconomic dynamics when agents expect that policymakers will coordinate to follow the …scally-led policy mix once the discrete demand shock switches back to high. The solid line captures the situation when agents expect a con ‡ict between the two authorities to break out right after the end of the low-demand period. The con ‡ict is assumed to occur from period 11 through period 20 (the light gray area) and agents expect that the …scal authority will win; that is, the policymakers will engage in …scally-led policies from period 21 on. The dashed-dotted line captures the steady-state values.
pressures on in ‡ation during the recession period (the dark gray area). Interestingly, the dynamics of the four variables depicted in Figure 3 are temporarily explosive during the con ‡ict period (the light gray area). As explained earlier in the paper, if these dynamics were to persist forever, they would not be consistent with a stationary solution for the model. However, the model is solved taking into account that this pattern is only temporary and that eventually the con ‡ict will come to an end. What is concerning is that during the institutional con ‡ict (the light gray area), the central bank is incapable of reining in in ‡ation. The monetary authority follows the Taylor principle and raises the interest rate aggressively to lower in ‡ation. Nonetheless, in ‡ation keeps growing. The lesson we learn is that when the central bank lacks the necessary …scal backing, hawkish monetary policy is not only ine¤ective, but also counterproductive, as it leads to a spiral of low output and high in ‡ation. The explosive dynamics of the interest rate and in ‡ation during the institutional con ‡ict can make the Federal Reserve an easy target for the media that could bring into question the central bank's ability to control in ‡ation and the soundness of the implemented policies.
If instead agents expect that policymakers will immediately coordinate on the …scally-led policy mix once the state of demand switches back to high, the large stock of debt leads to heightened and persistent in ‡ation. Since heightened in ‡ation expectations reduce the real value of debt, debt-to-GDP ratio grows only moderately during the recession. Furthermore, the dovish monetary policy keeps the real interest rate low, which contributes to mitigating the severity of the recession during the low-demand period (the dark gray area) and leads to an economic boom when the discrete demand shock becomes positive again (t 11).
The outcomes of both the coordinated and the uncoordinated strategies are clearly far from being desirable. While the coordinated strategy clearly dominates the non-coordinated both in terms of output stabilization and in terms of achieving a lower in ‡ation rate, in both cases policymakers miss their objective of keeping in ‡ation low. During the low-demand period (the dark gray area) and the post-con ‡ict period (from period 21 on) policymakers follow the same policy mix (i.e., the …scally-led policy mix). Therefore, in Figure 3 the vertical di¤erence between the solid line and the dashed line during the low-demand period (the dark gray area) captures the e¤ects of expecting a con ‡ict followed by the …scally-led policy mix on the macroeconomy. These e¤ects are fairly large. The recession is more severe and prolonged and the larger stock of debt pushes in ‡ation on a higher path. The vertical di¤erence between the solid and the dashed line from period 11 on (the light gray area) captures the macroeconomic implications of going through a con ‡ict. These implications are also very severe especially for real activity.
Con ‡ict and Monetary-led resolution. Figure 4 compares the scenario that we just discussed (solid line) with the opposite polar case in which the monetary authority is expected to eventually prevail (dotted line). This alternative scenario serves as a useful reference point that we will then use to discuss the consequences of relaxing the hypothesis that agents know with certainty which authority will eventually prevail. When the monetary authority is expected to prevail, the …scal stimulus is ine¤ective in raising in ‡ation expectations and, hence, to lower the real interest rate during the low-demand period. As a result, the economy goes through an output contraction and a sizable drop in in ‡ation. In ‡ation moves close to the target once the demand shock switches back to the high state. Nonetheless, the central bank tries to …ght the persistent in ‡ation that arises after the recession and, in doing so, impairs the economic activity, with the output gap remaining in negative territory for the duration of the institutional con ‡ict. Once the government gives up and switches to passive …scal policy, economic activity improves but still remains in negative territory because of the contractionary monetary policy.
Why does output remain slightly below target after the con ‡ict is resolved and policymakers follow the monetary-led policy mix? This happens because the central bank conducts an active policy and tries to rein in in ‡ation that remains persistently above target. In turn, in ‡ation is slightly above target because of the large stock of debt accumulated during the recession and the institutional con ‡ict. Since agents are aware of regime changes, they understand that the government can always renege on its commitment to stabilize the large stock of debt by raising taxes and move to the …scally-led policy mix. However, the probability of this event is Figure 4 : Dynamics of the output gap, in ‡ation, the federal funds rate (FFR), and the debt-to-GDP ratio when a negative discrete demand shock occurs in period 1 and persists until period 10 (the dark gray area). The discrete demand shock switches back to high from period 11 through period 30. Agents expect a con ‡ict between the two authorities following the end of the low demand shock period. The con ‡ict is assumed to occur from period 11 through period 20 (the light gray area). The solid line captures the case in which agents expect that the …scal authority will win the con ‡ict and, hence, the policy mix is expected to be …scally led after the con ‡ict. The dotted line captures the case in which the monetary authority is expected to prevail and, hence, the policy mix is expected to be monetary led after the con ‡ict period. The dashed-dotted line captures the steady-state values.
quite small: 1 p M M = 0:68%. 14 When the stock of debt is low, a low probability that the government will give up on stabilizing debt does not raise in ‡ation expectations signi…cantly. Nonetheless, when the stock of debt is so high as the one accumulated during the large recession (the dark gray area) and the subsequent institutional con ‡ict (the light gray area) in Figure  4 , in ‡ation remains above its steady-state value even though the probability that policymakers will engage in the …scally led policy mix in the future is small. This is for two reasons. First, such a large stock of debt can be stabilized only over a long period of time and the probability that policymakers will switch to the …scally led policies during this long period of time is not negligible. Second, if the switch to …scally-led policies happens when debt is high, the in ‡ationary consequences will be very severe. Furthermore, it should be noted that the little bump in in ‡ation after the con ‡ict and the associated amelioration of the output gap are due to the less aggressive anti-in ‡ationary policy conducted by the central bank under the monetary-led policy mix compared with the monetary policy carried out during the con ‡ict period ( ;M < ;C ; see Table 1 ). It is also interesting to notice that the output gap falls by a similar amount during the low-demand period regardless of the private sector's expectations about future monetary and …scal policies. In this respect, it is worth noting that from expecting di¤erent post-con ‡ict resolutions, there are two main e¤ects on the output gap during the low-demand period. If agents expect a con ‡ict followed by the …scally-led policy mix, they also expect a double-dip recession when the demand switches to the high state from period 11 until the end of the institutional con ‡ict. These expectations worsen the recession during the low-demand period because agents are forward looking. Note that if agents expect a con ‡ict followed by the …scallyled regime, the more persistent (in expectations) the …ght regime, the deeper the high-demand period's recession, and the worse the low-demand period's recession. There is, however, a second e¤ect. When agents expect that the monetary authority will prevail, policymakers fail to raise in ‡ation and, in fact, in ‡ation is close to zero during the low-demand period. On the contrary, when the …scal authority is expected to prevail, in ‡ation does not drop and remains close to target. Therefore, in the former case the real interest rate is higher and, hence, consumption and output are lower, everything else being equal. Our calibration is for the US economy and is based on previous studies. Given this calibration, it turns out that these two e¤ects tend to cancel each other out. Thus, the output gap during the low-demand period is remarkably similar regardless of the expected resolution of the con ‡ict. This result is not general and implies by no means that the expected resolution of the con ‡ict is inconsequential for the output dynamics during the low-demand period. In Appendix D, we illustrate this point via a counterexample.
Con ‡ict and Uncertain Resolution. So far, we have considered the polar opposite cases in which agents expect either the monetary-led resolution to the con ‡ict with a probability of one or the …scally-led resolution with a probability of one. We have chosen these polar cases in order to simplify the explanation of the mechanisms at play. Nevertheless, in practice, agents are likely to be fairly uncertain about the outcome of an institutional con ‡ict like the one studied in this paper. In Figure 4 , the vertical di¤erence between the solid line and the dotted line during the low-demand period (the dark gray area) and the con ‡ict period (the light gray area) spans the set of possible outcomes. 15 The exact outcomes depend on the private sector's beliefs about which authority will eventually emerge victorious from the con ‡ict. The set of possible outcomes is fairly large, including de ‡ation and high in ‡ation, severe recessions with the output gap plummeting to -4%, and moderate economic contractions with the output gap falling by less than one percentage point. The larger this set of beliefs-driven outcomes, the larger the degree of vulnerability of the economy to changes in the private sector's beliefs when 15 As shown in Appendix E, when agents are uncertain about how the institutional con ‡ict will be resolved, the macroeconomic dynamics during the low-demand period (gray area) and the con ‡ict period (light gray area) are a linear combination of those cases in which agents are not uncertain about which authority will prevail (i.e., the two polar cases discussed earlier). The higher the probability that the …scal (monetary) authority will win, the closer the macroeconomic dynamics will be to the solid (dotted) line. an institutional con ‡ict is expected to arise after the recession. If beliefs about which authority will prevail after the con ‡ict are erratic, macroeconomic volatility during the recession and the following con ‡ict period may be quite large. We discuss the case in which agents are uncertain about the outcome of the con ‡ict in Appendix E.
Key insight. To summarize, if the government's commitment to make the necessary …scal adjustments to stabilize a large stock of debt is questioned by the private sector, the central bank has two options. The central bank can accommodate these beliefs by abandoning its antiin ‡ationary stance, or it can …ght back and rea¢ rm its commitment to keep in ‡ation stable. In the former case, in ‡ation increases substantially and remains persistently high during and after the recession. In the latter case, an institutional con ‡ict is expected to happen after the recession and economic outcomes are largely driven by the private sector's expectations about which authority will change its policy to end the con ‡ict. We …nd that institutional con ‡icts lead inevitably to bad outcomes and are accompanied by large macroeconomic volatility. If the central bank is expected to lose the con ‡ict by switching to passive policies, a vicious spiral of low output, high in ‡ation, and high debt will arise during the con ‡ict period, which exacerbates the economic crisis and raises in ‡ation during the recession. Quite interestingly, in this scenario the central bank raises the policy rate but fails to rein in in ‡ation, which actually accelerates during the con ‡ict period. However, if the central bank is expected to win the con ‡ict, the …scal stimulus is ine¤ective in rescuing the economy from the large recession. The economy experiences a discrete and persistent drop in in ‡ation during the low-demand period, and a large stock of debt, as well as a persistently higher-than-target in ‡ation after the recession.
Debt Targeting
In this section, we study a coordinated strategy that can be implemented when the private sector loses con…dence in the government's ability/willingness to stabilize debt through …scal adjustments. This strategy commits the central bank to accept just enough higher in ‡ation to stabilize the debt-to-output ratio resulting from a large recession triggered by a negative demand shock. The government remains committed to making the necessary …scal adjustments to guarantee long-run …scal backing.
As shown here, this coordinated strategy can be implemented by explicitly announcing a target for the debt-to-GDP ratio that the …scal authority pledges to repay through future …scal adjustments. No …scal plans are instead provided to stabilize the o¤-target amount of the debtto-GDP ratio, which policymakers have agreed to in ‡ate away. The target is de…ned as the debt-to-output ratio that would have prevailed absent large demand shocks, d t . The central bank allows in ‡ation to rise just enough to in ‡ate away the o¤-target debt. We call this strategy the coordinated strategy or debt-targeting rule.
General Case
To model this coordinated strategy geared to in ‡ate away the amount of debt resulting from large recessions, we assume that policymakers respond to in ‡ation and the debt-to-output ratio according to the monetary-led policy mix all the time, except when responding to the discrete demand shock d t . Speci…cally, we assume that the response of the nominal interest rate to in ‡ation and that of primary surpluses to debt are both zero if movements in these variables result from the large demand shock. Furthermore, policymakers respond to all other ‡uctuations in in ‡ation and the debt-to-output ratio that are driven by Gaussian shocks by following the monetary-led policy mix. As explained earlier, Gaussian shocks are assumed to be too small to raise …scal strains that can fuel expectations that the government may be incapable of making the necessary …scal adjustments to stabilize debt. To simplify the analysis, we also assume that policymakers respond to the output gap by following the monetary-led policy mix regardless of the nature of the shocks that have hit the economy. 16 In order to implement this policy we construct a shadow economy to keep track of the amount of debt and in ‡ation resulting from the discrete preference shock. We denote the debt and in ‡ation of the shadow economy in which discrete demand shocks are shut down asb nd in ‡ation expectations during the recession by promising that the debt resulting from the economic downturn will be in ‡ated away. Consequently, this promise puts downward pressures on the real interest rate, and hence, the drop in the output gap is mitigated compared with the cases where an institutional con ‡ict is expected to break out after the recession. Given that the recession is contained, the above-target debt b t b nd t grows only moderately and so does in ‡ation necessary to stabilize it. As the debt-to-GDP ratio slowly converges to its target, the price dynamics slow down and in ‡ation gets closer to its two-percent target.
The coordinated policy rules (29)-(30) imply that policymakers follow the …scally-led policy mix only in response to the debt-to-output ratio and in ‡ation resulting from the low state of demand. The policy rules imply that the central bank always follows an active monetary policy in response to output gap ‡uctuations. This is the reason why the interest rate falls during the recession in Figure 5 . This feature of the coordinated policy rules can be relaxed with little e¤ects on the results of the paper.
Finally, as shown in Appendix G, the dynamics of the output gap, in ‡ation, and nominal interest rate are totally una¤ected by the pre-crisis size of the debt-to-GDP ratio, which will be stabilized by taking the necessary …scal measures. This makes it clear that the proposed policy separates the issue of long-run …scal sustainability from the need to intervene during exceptional events. This is a feature of the coordinated strategy that we will investigate further in the following section.
Avoiding Liquidity Traps
The zero ‡oor for nominal interest rates can be a signi…cant constraint on the ability of a central bank to combat de ‡ation. Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) propose the use of forward guidance, which are announcements about the likely future path of the policy rate, to ease this constraint on monetary policy. These scholars suggest promising a period of monetary accommodation once the recession is over. In doing so, the central bank is promising a boom and higher in ‡ation after the recession, leading to a fall in the real rate that mitigates the recession as well as the drop in in ‡ation.
Our coordinated strategy can be regarded as an alternative way of promising higher in ‡ation after a period of very low demand. The distinctive feature of our approach is the coordination between monetary and …scal policies so as to rule out zero lower bound episodes by generating in ‡ationary pressures from …scal imbalances. As for forward guidance, higher in ‡ation lowers the real interest rate and, in doing so, stimulates economic activity, reducing the size of the output contraction and stabilizing the price dynamics during periods of extremely low demand. As we shall show, this mechanism can be strong enough to prevent the economy from hitting the zero lower bound. At the same time, agents understand that the increase in in ‡ation is the result of a well-de…ned, exceptional contractionary event, which policymakers are not responsible for, while policy strategies to cope with business cycle (Gaussian) disturbances are unchanged. Figure 6 shows the dynamics of the output gap, in ‡ation, federal funds rate, and debt-to-GDP ratio following a very large negative demand shock, which is calibrated to be as big as the one that caused the Great Recession based on estimates by Bianchi and Melosi (2017) . We calibrate the initial debt to be 35% of GDP, which was the debt-to-GDP ratio in the U.S. before the Great Recession according to CBO's estimates. 17 The dashed line captures the macroeconomic dynamics when policymakers follow a monetary-led policy mix during the low-demand period (the gray area) and agents expect that this policy mix will be followed in every future period. We observe that this strong commitment to monetary dominance would lead monetary policy to become constrained by the zero lower bound during the recession. 18 The solid line captures the macroeconomic dynamics when policymakers are not committed to stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio resulting from the large recession. This coordinated commitment allows the central bank to avoid the zero lower bound by raising in ‡ation expectations.
Our coordinated monetary and …scal policy strategy is in line with the policies advocated by 17 Changing the size of the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is inconsequential for the results that follow. See Appendix G, where we show that changing the initial stock of debt is inconsequential if policymakers coordinate to in ‡ate away only the portion of debt resulting from the large recession. Furthermore, if the monetary-led policy mix is followed in every state of the world, the macroeconomy is fully insulated from …scal developments. 18 Monetary policy does not become constrained exactly when the recession starts but only a few quarters after because the central bank adjusts the interest rate smoothly ( R;M = 0:8697). 
Debt-to-GDP Ratio
Debt-Targeting Rule Always ML Rule Figure 6 : Dynamics of the output gap, in ‡ation, federal funds rate (FFR), and debt-to-GDP ratio after a negative discrete demand shock that occurs in period 1 and persists until period 10 (the gray area). The magnitude of this shock is comparable to the demand shock that caused the Great Recession (Bianchi and Melosi 2017 Sims (2016) who suggests replacing ine¤ective monetary policies at the zero lower bound with an "e¤ective …scal policy."According to Sims, e¤ective …scal policy at the zero lower bound requires that both the monetary and …scal authorities clearly announce that …scal accommodation will not be removed until in ‡ation will attain a given in ‡ation target. Sims also argues that a commitment to generate in ‡ation that involves the …scal authority might also be more credible than one that relies solely on the behavior of the monetary authority, given the time that it takes to revert …scal decisions. We consider this as an interesting direction for future research. Our shock-speci…c rule is also related to Correia et al. (2013) , who show how distortionary taxes can be used to replicate the e¤ects of negative nominal interest rates, and Galí (2014) , who analyzes the e¤ects of a …scal stimulus …nanced through money creation. Both these papers work under the assumption that a monetary-led policy mix is always in place. Our mechanism is based on a systematic policy response to exceptionally large shocks and does not require using distortionary taxation or printing money (even if, of course, we could introduce money and derive its implied path.) Instead, our shock-speci…c rule works by making debt …scally unsustainable by specifying the way policymakers react to exceptionally large shocks. In this respect, our shock-speci…c rule is in the spirit of Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2002) who, following Woodford (2003) , work in a deterministic environment to show that a de ‡ationary steady state can be made …scally unsustainable.
Conclusions
This paper studies the implication of the lack of coordination between the monetary and …scal authorities. By lack of coordination we mean a situation in which both authorities are trying to control the rate of in ‡ation. When agents expect that policymakers will not coordinate their policies after a large recession, two outcomes can arise. One possible outcome is that policymakers appear to be incapable of raising in ‡ation expectations to rescue the economy from the recession. The other possible outcome is also dire. The economy enters a spiral of growing debt, declining output, and raising in ‡ationary pressures as a result of the monetary tightening that is not backed by future …scal consolidations. Which case will prevail depends on which authority is expected to change its policy to coordinate with the other.
We then consider a coordinated policy strategy that is capable of mitigating the recession by raising in ‡ation expectations in an orderly manner. This strategy consists of a commitment to in ‡ating away only the portion of debt that exceeds an announced target. This target is de…ned as the debt-to-output ratio that would have prevailed absent the large contractionary shock. In practice, an approximate measure of such a debt-to-GDP ratio can be obtained by projecting the pre-recession stock of debt into the future. The central bank allows in ‡ation to rise just enough to in ‡ate away the o¤-target debt. This strategy succeeds in mitigating deep recessions because it a¤ects agents'beliefs about policymakers'long-run behavior in response to a speci…c large shock. In fact, policymakers are committing to never increasing taxes in response to the amount of debt accumulated during large contractions and, at the same time, to not combating the resulting increase in in ‡ation. This policy triggers an increase in shortrun in ‡ation expectations and an immediate increase in in ‡ation as large demand shocks hit the economy. The proposed strategy has the virtue of clearly separating short-run policy interventions from the issue of long-run …scal sustainability. This coordinated strategy can also be used to promise a rate of in ‡ation after a severe recession so as to avoid hitting the zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate.
The system (16) can then be equivalently written as
Now the laws of motion for p t and t are disjoint equations (one stable and one unstable) and hence, for stability we need to impose t = 0 at all times. In ‡ation expectations move so as to keep real debt on a stable path. The exact link between these two endogenous variables can be obtained by the following equation
which implies equation (18) in the main text. Assuming 1 + 6 = 0, then the following holds true
Now that we know the law of motion for in ‡ation expectations, we can use the monetaryblock equation (14) to work out the law of motion for in ‡ation, which is
Combining this equation with equation (15) yields: across regimes H, the structural parameters , and the current state t :
where Q is a diagonal matrix that contains the standard deviations of the structural shocks and Z t is a vector with all variables of the model.
Unlike other papers that have used the technique described here, our model allows for nonorthogonality between policymakers'behavior and a discrete shock. This allows us to solve a model in which agents take into account that a large preference shock leads to an immediate change in policy, including the zero lower bound, and the ensuing exit strategies. This proposed method is general and can be applied to other cases in which a shock induces a change in the structural parameters. Table 2 reports the parameter values we have used to calibrate the model that we have studied in the main text of the paper. These are based on the posterior mode estimated by Bianchi and Melosi (2017) .
C Parameter Values

D Expected Resolution and the Low-Demand Period' s Output Gap
As shown in Figure 4 , the output gap during the low-demand period is remarkably similar regardless of the expected resolution of the con ‡ict. This result is not general and does not imply that the expected resolution of the con ‡ict is always inconsequential for the output dynamics during low-demand periods.
To illustrate this point, we tweak the value of two key parameters. One parameter is the probability p CC , which controls the expected duration of the institutional con ‡ict. We lower this parameter from 0.90 (as noted in Table 1 ) to 0.75. This has the e¤ect of mitigating the expected double-dip recession for the case in which agents expect a …scally-led resolution of the con ‡ict (i.e., the …scal authority is expected to emerge from the institutional con ‡ict victorious). Furthermore, we lower the central bank's response to in ‡ation under the …scallyled policy mix ( ;F ) from 0.6903 to 0.1. This alternative parameterization makes the central bank less aggressive when it comes to adjusting the nominal rate to stabilize in ‡ation in the …scally-led regime. Figure 7 shows the outcomes under these alternative values assigned to the probability p CC and the policy parameter ;F . Contrary to Figure 4 , di¤erent expectations about how the con ‡ict will be resolved lead to radically di¤erent implications for the dynamics of the output gap during the low-demand period (the dark gray area). If agents expect the the …scal authority will emerge victorious from the institutional con ‡ict (solid line in both Figure 4 and Figure 7) , the in ‡ation generated from the …scal imbalance leads to a lower real interest rate and, hence, to stronger economic activity compared with the case in which the central bank is relatively more hawkish when the …scally-led regime is in place ( ;F = 0:6903 as in Table 1 ). Since forwardlooking agents anticipate these e¤ects, the recession is greatly mitigated and in ‡ation jumps above target during the low-demand period. Furthermore, expecting a shorter lasting con ‡ict following the low-demand period further improves economic activity during the low-demand period.
E Con ‡ict and Uncertain Resolution
Finally, we consider the case in which there is uncertainty over how the con ‡ict will be resolved. Figure 8 shows the two extreme cases (i.e., 100% expected …scally-led resolution and 100% expected monetary led resolution) that we have analyzed in Appendix D, together with a scenario in which agents attach 50% of probability that the …scal authority will win the con ‡ict Figure 7 : Dynamics of the output gap, in ‡ation, the federal funds rate (FFR), and the debt-to-GDP ratio when a negative discrete demand shock occurs in period 1 and persists until period 10 (the dark gray area). The discrete demand shock switches back to high from period 11 through period 30. Agents expect a con ‡ict between the two authorities following the end of the low-demand shock period. The con ‡ict is assumed to occur from period 11 through period 20 (the light gray area). The solid line captures the case in which agents expect that the …scal authority will win the con ‡ict and, hence, the policy mix is expected to be …scally led after the con ‡ict. The dotted line captures the case in which the monetary authority is expected to prevail and, hence, the policy mix is expected to be monetary led after the con ‡ict period. Unlike in the main text (Figure 4) , the probability of staying in the con ‡ict regime is 0.75 and the central bank's response to in ‡ation under the …scally-led regime is 0.1. The dashed-dotted line captures the steady-state values.
and 50% of probability that the monetary authority will succeed. 20 The starred line lies between the solid line and the dotted line all the time in the dark gray area and in the light gray area. This suggests that when agents are uncertain about how the institutional con ‡ict will be resolved, the macroeconomic dynamics during the low-demand period (the dark gray area) and the con ‡ict period (the light gray area) are a linear combination of those in the case in which agents are not uncertain about which authority will prevail. The higher the probability that the …scal (monetary) authority will win, the closer the macroeconomic dynamics will be to the solid (dotted) line. The vertical di¤erence between the solid line and the dotted line during the recession and the con ‡ict period spans the set of possible outcomes. The exact outcomes depend on the private sector's beliefs about which authority will eventually emerge victorious from the con ‡ict. The set of possible outcomes is fairly large, including de ‡ation and high in ‡ation, severe recessions with the output gap plummeting to -4% and moderate economic contractions with the output , and the debt-to-GDP ratio when a negative discrete demand shock occurs in period 1 and persists until period 10 (the dark gray area). The discrete demand shock switches back to high from period 11 through 30. Agents expect a con ‡ict between the two authorities following the end of the low demand shock period. The con ‡ict is assumed to occur from period 11 through period 20 and is highlighted by the light gray area. The solid line captures the case in which agents expect that the …scal authority will win the con ‡ict and, hence, the policy mix is expected to be …scally led after the con ‡ict. The dotted line captures the case in which the monetary authority is expected to prevail and, hence, the policy mix is expected to be monetary led after the con ‡ict period. The starred line captures the case in which agents expect that the monetary authority will prevail with 50 percent of probability. The probability of staying in the con ‡ict regime is 0.75 and the central bank's response to in ‡ation under the …scally-led regime is 0.1. The dashed-dotted line captures the steady-state values.
gap falling to less than one percentage point. The bigger this set of beliefs-driven outcomes, the larger the degree of vulnerability of the economy to changes in the private sector's beliefs when an institutional con ‡ict is expected to arise after the recession. If beliefs about which authority will win the con ‡ict are erratic, the macroeconomic volatility during the recession and the following con ‡ict period may be quite large.
F Debt Targeting
To do the exercise in Section 5, we write the linearized equations derived from the model of Section 3. Nonetheless, we use the policy rules (29)-(30) to describe the policymakers'behavior. This set of equations describe the actual economy. For the model to be mathematically well speci…ed, we need to add the equations that capture the law of motion for the targetsb nd t 1 and~ nd t 1 . This set of equations is exactly the same as the one of the actual economy with the exception of the Euler equation that reads b 
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High Debt Low Debt Figure 9 : Dynamics of the output gap, in ‡ation, federal funds rate (FFR), and debt-to-GDP ratio after a negative discrete demand shock that occurs in period 1 and persists until period 10 (the gray area). After the recession the state of demand switches to the high regime from period 11 through period 30. The lines capture these dynamics when the debt targeting rule is implemented under two di¤erent initial debt-to-GDP ratios. The economy described by the dotted line starts with a higher initial debt. The dashed-dotted line captures the steady-state values. and the …scal and monetary rules that read 
Notice that the Euler equation of the shadow economy (44) does not feature the discrete demand shock d d t . Furthermore, the policy rules (45)-(46) feature the monetary-led parameterization. Furthermore, note that the discrete preference shock does not a¤ect potential output. Thus, b y nd t = b y t .
G Higher Initial Debt-to-Output Ratio Figure 9 shows the dynamics of the output gap, in ‡ation, the federal funds rate, and the debtto-GDP ratio when the coordinated strategy of in ‡ating away only the portion of debt resulting from the recession is implemented. We consider two cases that di¤er from the initial level of debt. As one can see, the initial level of debt does not a¤ect the dynamics of the output gap, in ‡ation, and interest rate whatsoever. This is because policymakers are committed to following the monetary-led policy mix to stabilize the pre-existing level of debt. Since taxation is assumed to be non-distorsive, there are no consequences of …scal adjustments for the macroeconomy in these cases.
